Wheeler v. State, Minn.Ct.App., 1/23/2017. The court of appeals tackles the question when does the trial court get too far into the weeds of plea negotiations? Ms. Wheeler pled guilty to aiding and abetting second degree unintentional murder. The state had initially charged her with intentional second degree murder. Two of her children witnessed part of the murder and the trial court made it known to the parties that the idea of these kids having to testify against their mother didn't sit too well. So, he instructed the parties to make a good faith effort to reach a resolution and to keep it apprised of any movement.
The parties kept negotiating right up to and continuing after the start of trial. Just before trial the judge let it be known that a plea to manslaughter in the second degree, even with a double departure sentence was unacceptable. After the first day of trial the judge stated that he'd heard that the state was willing to offer an unintentional second degree murder with some yet to be determined sentencing range within the applicable guidelines box but that Ms. Wheeler had declined that offer. In actuality, she and her attorney hadn't yet discussed it. During the weekend recess, Ms. Wheeler's attorneys notified the court that that she would be willing to plead guilty to aiding and abetting second degree unintentional murder, with a guidelines sentence to be determined by the trial court. When the trial resumed, however, Ms. Wheeler entered a guilty plea to that second degree unintentional murder but with a specific sentencing range of 128 to 180 months. The trial court accepted that plea. At sentencing the trial court imposed a sentence of 172 months.
After a while, Ms. Wheeler filed a post conviction petition in which she said she was entitled to withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court had improperly participated in the plea negotiations. The court summarily denied the petition.
Here's how the court has described the role of the trial court in plea negotiations:
The ultimate judicial responsibility must be to make reasonably certain that a person innocent of any crime has not been improperly induced to plead guilty to a crime. It is likewise a judicial responsibility to protect society against a defendant’s being permitted to bargain for a plea excessively lenient for the gravity of the crime apparently in fact committed. Although the court should neither usurp the responsibility of counsel nor participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself, its proper role of discreet inquiry into the propriety of the settlement submitted for judicial acceptance cannot seriously be doubted.
State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 156 N.W.2d 218 (1968).
The court of appeals said that a trial court crosses the line into impermissible interjection when it induces a guilty plea by a promise of a particular sentence, or when it imposes plea terms against the objections of a party. Some examples include:
A district court reversibly errs when it induces a guilty plea by a promise of a particular sentence, or when it imposes plea terms against the objections of a party. In Melde, we held that the district court improperly inserted itself into plea negotiations when it told the defendant that it would impose a 46-month executed sentence if he affirmed his guilty plea after the district court had rejected a proposed plea agreement. 778 N.W.2d at 379. In Anyanwu, we held that the district court erred when it promised and gave the defendant a 210-month sentence over the prosecutor’s objection. 681 N.W.2d at 413, 415. We stated that “the district court directly and unequivocally promised the defendant a particular sentence in advance, and forced the plea bargain on the prosecutor.” Id. at 415. In Vahabi, we held that the district court impermissibly participated in plea negotiations when it sentenced the defendant in a manner objected to by the state, and which led us to conclude that the “[t]he parties to [the] plea agreement were the court and the defendants, not the prosecution and the defendants.” 529 N.W.2d at 361. And in Moe, we held that the district court impermissibly inserted itself into plea negotiations when it offered the defendant a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines over the prosecutor’s objection, if the defendant cooperated with the police in an unrelated matter. 479 N.W.2d at 429.
Ms. Wheeler said that the court had facilitated a plea agreement by indicating that it would not sentence at either the top or the bottom of the sentencing range. The was not, says the court of appeals, an unequivocal sentencing promise that a trial court can't make. She also said that the trial court impermissibly suggested that the state offer an amended charge of second degree unintentional murder. The court of appeals seem to think that this was a closer call but decided that the court hadn't really extended a plea offer, or if it did Ms. Wheeler rejected it. The record supported the conclusion that it was the state that had initially offered the second degree unintentional murder plea, not the court. Finally, Ms. Wheeler said that the trial court impermissibly pressured the parties to enter into a plea agreement so that her children would not have to testify against her at trial. The court of appeals concluded that this was really nothing more than fair comment if not part of the court's responsibility to monitor plea negotiations. nb tgtbg00121
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